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Three Underground Coal Mine Explosions -Twenty Miners Killed - One Reason
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Department of Mining Engineering
University of Kentucky

ABS1RACT
Three mine explosions which occurred in the 1980s (1983 - McClure No. 1 Mine, Virginia; 1984 - Greenwich Collieries No.
1 Mine, Pennsylvania; and 1989- Pyro No.9 Slope Williams Station Mine, Kentucky) cost twenty lives. The authors, by
investigating these three cases, found a common ventilation problem. This problem was the misunderstanding of the diagonal
connections in the mine ventilation system (MVS).
Based on the findings from these investigations, the authors explain the importance of diagonal connections in a MVS
and discuss other factors that affected safety.
KEYWORDS
Stability of Ventilation Currents, Diagonal Connections, Flow Reversal, and Canonical Diagrams.

INTRODUCTION
The idea for this paper began almost 15 years ago, when the
multidisciplinary BRASH (Behavioral Research Aspects of
Safety and Health) research group at the University of Kentucky led by H.P. Cole, designed and field tested a set of
simulation exercises. These exercises both teach and test a
variety of judgement, decision making, and problem solving
skills required for coping with emergency conditions in
underground coal mines. This research was supported by the
U.S. Bureau of Mines contract H0348040 and with the assistance of many persons and groups in the mining industry
[Cole, et al., 1993]. The first author of this paper was asked,
as a member of the BRASH group, to contrive a few mine
ventilation simulation exercises. In 1985, when the preparation for the development of these exercises was taking place,
the memory of the McClure Mine explosion ( 1983) and the
Greenwich Collieries explosion was still fresh. The first
author, being familiar with the cause of these disasters, decided to use the McClure Mine explosion scenario as a basis
for his simulation exercises, because this scenario depicted a
typical problem associated with diagonal connections. Out of
the 65 ventilation exercises developed by the BRASH group,
one was designed in two alternate versions, the first version
called the Delta Mine Cut-through exercise (DMC) and the
second called the Cut-through Ventilation Arrangement
exercise (CVA) (Wala and Cole, 1987). Both of these teaching
and testing exercises are available from local MSHA offices.

These ventilation exercises were used to test and teach a
control group of personnel from various locations in the
mining community, and performance data were gathered from
this. This data were then analyzed and further tested; the
results were published by Passaro, et al., in 1994.
After the release of the 1990 Report of Investigation concerning the 1989 Pyro No. 9 Slope William Station Mine
explosion, the first author of this paper read the report and
subsequently analyzed the ventilation system. The fmdings of
his analysis are presented in this paper.

DIAGONAL CONNECTIONS IN MINE VENTILATION
Mine ventilation generally consists of an arrangement of
multiple, interconnected airways, often creating a complicated
MVS. A point where two or more airways intersect is called
a junction or a node. Airways that connect these nodes are
called branches. The sets of junctions and branches with their
associated flows can be considered the mine ventilation
network (MVN). If the branches are connected in series and/or
parallel, the branches of such a system are called ordinary
branches and the MVN is named a simple network. However,
if there exists a branch that connects two points of different
branches, then this branch is called a diagonal branch and the
MVN is no longer a simple network. In this case it is called a
complex network.
The airflow through a diagonal branch can reverse, and
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its direction depends on the resistances of the branches interconnected with it. Diagonal connections ahnost always exist
in a MVS; however, good planning can decrease the total
number of these branches. Usually it is not possible to eliminate all of them, but it is important to recognize the problems
associated with their existence and to pay attention to their
effect on the MVS.

STABILITY CONDITIONS FOR A COMPLEX MVN
The stability of the flow through a diagonal connection is
related to the resistance of the airways interconnected with the
diagonal branch, as was mentioned above. These relationships,
known by engineers as the basic ·Wheatstone Bridge (see
Figure I) balance conditions for electrical circuits, they are
displayed as follows;
First situation: No flow through the diagonal branch.

!1_=~
R2

These Wheatstone Bridge balance conditions are relevant
for the analysis of the ventilation network (circuit). Figure 2
shows a line diagram of the ventilation system with aerodynamic resistances comparable to the Wheatstone Bridge
electrical resistances shown in Figure 1.
Closer examination of Figure 2, which represents the
ventilation arrangement around a newly developed longwall
panel, shows that the resistances of the ordinary branches can
vary. The mining process, control devices, roof falls, and
mishandling of the ventilation controls can cause this variability. As can be seen from the relations in Equations (1 ), (2),
and (3), the resistance of the diagonal branch does not affect
the airflow direction. However, its magnitude does influence
the flow quantity through the diagonal branch. If a flow
reversal occurs in the diagonal branch, there is some period of
time where the flow is stagnant. If the changing resistances of
the surrounding branches are slow, this situation could prevail
for a prolonged period of time.
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Third situation: Flow from node A to B.
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Figure 2. Line diagram of the ventilation system around a
newly developed longwall panel.

ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES

2

1

Figure 1. Wheatstone Bridge - electrical circuit.

There are two scenarios where diagonal branches can adversely affect the ventilation system. The first scenario is
when a diagonal connection already exists in a system and a
flow . reversal or a stagnation occurs due to the resistance
changes around it. The second scenario is when a diagonal
branch is added, which causes a flow redistribution in the
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surrounding branches.
However, existing diagonal branches can be useful during
fire fighting or mine rescue operations. Contaminated air
(mine fire gasses) may attempt to flow into the working areas,
but by altering the flow direction in a diagonal branch, it is
possible to deliver fresh air to areas where it is needed.
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In 1956 Bystron developed a method for the graphical
presentation of a mine ventilation schematic that distinguishes
ordinary from diagonal air currents. Bystron's method uses
straight lines to represent the diagonal branches and arcs to
represent the normal branches and he also suggested a safety
indicator, SI, for ventilation systems based on the number of
ordinary branches and diagonal branches expressed as folM
lows;

GRAPHICAL DISPLAY OF A MVN
SI = 0 I (0 +D)
Different graphical methods of drawing schematics have been
used to represent MVNs. The most common method used in
the United States is the line diagram, which usually mirrors
the mine plan layout. Another method is the canonical diagram or canonical graph, a noncalibrated topological image
(graph) of a mine's ventilation system. The canonical diagram
is used almost exclusively in Europe, especially in Poland
after it was developed by Czeczott in 1925. This diagram is
especially useful in studying and controlling flow distributions
and when conducting rescue and fire fighting operations.
By using the canonical diagram, it is easier to distinguish
between ordinary and diagonal branches, which is an important safety concern in underground mines. As mentioned
before, this information is very useful when quick and proper
decisions are needed during fire-fighting or rescue operations.
Czeczott explained the possible dangers created by diagonal
connections in an underground mine ventilation system, in his
original work (1925).

3

4

(4)

where N is the number of ordinary branches, and D is the
number of diagonal branches. Figure 3 shows the canonical
diagram representing the schematic displayed in Figures 1 and
2. Patigny and Jacques (1973) and Miekus (1975), using the
graph theory, developed a method and algorithm for classifying air currents.

THREE EXPLOSIONS - DIAGONAL CONNECTIONS
WERE THE REASON
The following are three different case studies concerning
explosions that occurred in U.S. underground coal mines in
the 1980's. The underlying cause of these explosions, as
interpreted by the authors, was not recognizing the diagonal
connections and their possible effects on the ventilation
system. The authors' interpretations are based on infonnation
gathered from the three corresponding MSHA's Report of
Investigation (U.S. Department of Labor, MSHA, 1983, 1984,
and 1990). As a result of these explosions, twenty lives were
lost.

McClure Mine Disaster
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Figure 3. Canonical diagram that corresponds with the
schematics shown in Figures 1 and 2.

On June 21, 1983, an explosion claimed the lives of seven
miners at the McClure No. 1 Mine of the Clinchfield Coal
Company, Virginia. The reason for this explosion was a poor
ventilation practice when connecting the two longwall development sections, 1st Left and 2nd Left (see Figure 4). The
underlying factor can be traced to the creation of a diagonal
connection, formed by the cut-through, merging two mining
sections to form the longwall setup rooms.
Figure 4 shows a line diagram of the above described
ventilation system. The air courses of the two sections,
branches 2-4-7 and 2-3M5-6-7, were nearly identical in length
and cross sectional area. Therefore, the frictional resistances
of these two sections' airways were approximately equal,
leading to an equal flow distribution between the sections.
However, due to methane liberation along branches 3-5a-5,
additional flow was needed for dilution. This goal was
achieved by placing a regulator, it is Rr in Figure 4, in the
return side of the 1st Left Section (branch 4-7). It resulted in
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an airflow equal to 19,000 cfm in the 1st Left Section and
40,000 cfm in the 2nd Left Section. When these two sections
were connected by branch 4-5 (cut-through), the "third situation" described by Equation (3) was created, causing a flow
redistribution in the surrounding branches. This cut-through
was performed near the end of the 2nd shift and air readings
were taken in each section return afterwards. These new
measurements indicated that 16,000 cfm was flowing in the
1st Left Section return and 43,000 cfm in the 2nd Left Section
return. Based upon the readings taken prior to and following
the cut-through, it was assumed that 3,000 cfm of air was
flowing from node 4 to node 5, when in fact it was 23,000
cfm. By a simple mathematical balance of the airflow in the
branches, it can be found that only 20,000 cfm was flowing in
the 2nd Left's intake (before it was 40,000 cfm) where the
methane liberation problem existed. The section crew of the
2nd Left Section went home, because their shift was over,
without constructing a control to separate the two aircourses.
They presumed there was no significant change in the flow
distribution. The intake flow on the 2nd Left was insufficient
to dilute the methane being liberated into branch 3-5a-5, and
the methane was allowed to accumulate during the idle third
shift period. The next day, the first shift crew arrived to the
section, turned on the feeder, and ignited the explosive methane concentration in this area. The problem probably would
have been found and corrected, if the ventilation change had
been handled according to federal regulations.
Figure 5 shows the canonical diagram of this ventilation
system. The diagonal connection created by branch 4-5 is
easily recognizable in this diagram. It can also be seen that
there was another diagonal connection formed by branch 5a-5,
but the airflow in this branch did not reverse and did not
influence the redistribution of the air in the effected area.

Greenwich Collieries Mine Disaster
On February 16, 1984, a mine explosion at the Greenwich
Collieries No. 1 Mine, Pennsylvania claimed the lives of three
miners and severely burned four others. Again, this explosion
can be linked to a diagonal connection. Figures 6 and 7 show
the simplified line diagram and the canonical diagram of this
mine ventilation arrangement, respectively.
Originally, the inby longwall gob area was ventilated by
the air current flowing through branches 3-9-11-12-13 (D-3
Section to D-1 Section). Due to water accumulations behind
the inby gob area, a pump was placed in branch 9-10. The
same water accumulation started forming inby the D-5 active,
retreat pillaring section. To reduce the water accumulation on
the D-5 Section, a diagonal connection, branch 10-6, was
created to allow the water to reach the D-3 pump in branch 910. By making this connection, the airflows were redistributed
in the surrounding branches creating the "third situation"
described by Equation (3). The section foreman stated that

immediately after completing the cut-through, the airflow
direction was from D-3 Section to D-5 Section (node 10 to
node 6) and that the air smelled "stale". This was the indication that the gob bleeder, branch 10-11, had reversed its flow
direction, now from node II to node 10. A curtain was hung
across the cut-through. The pump in branch 9 to I 0 was still
in a fresh air current at this time, because the air direction in
branches 3-9-10 was unaffected. Figure 8 shows the canonical
diagram of this ventilation arrangement.
Two months later, a second cut-through was made connecting nodes 9 and 5, and again the stale air was noticed.
This indicated a flow reversal in branch 10-9, bringing the
contaminated air from the bleeder over the pump. A curtain
was placed in the opening, allowing leakage from D-3 to D-5.
This curtain reduced the flow from nodes 1I to 10 to 9 allowing for the methane to build up in this bleeder system. The
direction of flow in branch 3-9 was not changed.
A permanent stopping was then built over the branch 106 cut-through. Figure 9 shows the canonical diagram of this
arrangement. Due to problems with the water pump (branch 910), a crew of three was sent to the pump location to repair it.
The explosion was centered in the branch 9-10 area and was
triggered by the battery-powered locomotive that was being
used by this working crew.

Pyro No. 9 Slope William Station Mine Disaster
An explosion at the Pyro Mining Company's William
Station Mine, Kentucky, occurred on September 13, 1989 on
the longwall recovery area of Panel "0", claiming the lives of
ten miners who were recovering longwall mining equipment.
The official cause of death for all ten victims was smoke, soot,
and/or toxic fume inhalation resulting from the explosion. The
I990 MSHA accident report cited that one of the contributing
factors was "the failure to recognize the sensitivity of the
bleeder system and the effects of the numerous ventilation
changes." The following interpretation of the events leading
to the explosion will show that the "sensitivity" of this system
can be traced to the numerous diagonal branches and their
effects on the·ventilation system.
Figures I 0 and 11 show the simplified line diagram and
the canonical diagram, respectively, of the pertinent portion of
the mine ventilation system. Originally the air was routed as
required by the Approved Ventilation Plan. The intake air
came up the headgate (branch 13-14) and split, where some of
the air went inby the longwall in the bleeder branch 14-18,
and the major portion went across the active face (branch 1415) and was regulated on the return side in branch 15-16.
Subsequently the rest of the tailgate air flowed into the gob
area from node 15 to node 19. A curtain was used in the
headgate bleeder entry (branch 14-I8) to regulate its flow. The
Panel "P" setup rooms (branch 20-21) and the 2nd Main North
(by branches 4-20 and 5-21) were connected to the bleeder
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system ofPanel "0", creating numerous diagonal connections,
which are represented as straight line connections in Figure
11.
After the longwall fmished mining the panel, the regulator was removed from branch 15-16. This caused the air to
redistribute, and therefore the pre-existing diagonal branches
21-18, 18-14 and 19-15 reversed their flow directions. Figure
12 shows the canonical diagram representing this scenario.
The branch 18-14 bleeder was now flowing toward the Panel
"0" recovery face with an insufficient volume to dilute the
methane concentrations being liberated from the gob. The
explosion occurred around the node 14 location, or the headgate of this longwall. Branch 14-18 (headgate-inby) was the
diagonal branch that caused the accident. Failure to accurately
predict the behavior of the diagonal connections resulted in
the explosion.

CONCLUSION
1.

Diagonal connections almost always exist in a MVS;
however, good planning can decrease the total number of
these branches. Usually it is not possible to eliminate all
of them, but it is important to recognize the problems associated with them and to pay attention to their effect on
the MVS.
2. Some diagonal connections are more stable than others.
All of these connections need to be recognized, but special attention needs to be paid to those that are sensitive
to mining activities, which can effect their behavior.
3. There are two scenarios where diagonal branches can
adversely effect the ventilation system. The first scenario
is when a diagonal connection already exists in a system
and a flow reversal or stagnation occurs due to the resistance changes around it, as in the Pyro Mining explosion.
The second scenario is when a diagonal branch is added,
which causes a flow redistribution in the surrounding
branches, as in the McClure Mine and Greenwich Collieries explosions.
4. Existing diagonal branches can be useful during fire
fighting or mine rescue operations. Contaminated air
(mine fire gasses) may attempt to flow into the working
areas, but by altering the flow direction in a diagonal
branch, it is possible to deliver fresh air to areas where it
is needed.
5. Mining companies need to analyze their existing diagonal
connections and consider how new diagonal connections
will influence their ventilation system.
6. Further research is needed in the development of mining
maps or schematics that clearly show the existence of diagonal connections.
7. Education and training are needed to teach mine personnel and people that are responsible for ventilation deci-
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sions on how to recognize and minimize diagonal
branches.
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Figure 4. Line Diagram ofthe ventilation arrange around the
McClure Mine longwall panel.

Figure 6. Simplified line diagram of the ventilation arrangement at the Greenwich collieries prior to the diagonal connection.
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Figure 5. Canonical diagram (schematic) of the ventilation
arrangement at the McClure Mine.

Figure 7. Canonical schematic corresponding to Figure 6
(before the diagonal connections were made).
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Figure 8. Canonical diagram of the MVS after the completion of the first cut-through.
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Figure 10. Simplified line diagram of the ventilation at the
Pyro No. 9- William Station Mine, before the longwall tailgate regulator was "cut out".
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Figure 9. Canonical diagram of the MVS after the completion of the second cut-through.
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Figure 11. Canonical schematic corresponding with the
ventilation system shown in Figure 10.
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Figure 12. Canonical schematic of the ventilation system
around Panel "0" after the longwall tailgate regulator was
"cut out".

